State of Utah v. Edward H. James : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
State of Utah v. Edward H. James : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
D. Bruce Oliver; Attorney for Appellant.
Christine F. Soltis; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Randon Draper; Cache County Attorney;
Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. James, No. 970544 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1068
OuRT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
U 
DCX^ivkfcNT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
SOCKET NO. - <?7**«-gt 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-000O000-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS B. JAMES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 970544-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Final Judgment and Jury Verdict 
of the First Judicial District Court, County of Cache 
State of Utah, by the Honorable Burton H. Harris 
Christine F. Soltis 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
City, Utah 84114 
Randon Draper 
Cache County Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
FILED 
Utab Court of AoDeals 
AHK 2 2 4*S8 
Julia D'AJesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-000O000-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS B. JAMES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 970544-CA 
( Priority No. 2 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Final Judgment and Jury Verdict 
of the First Judicial District Court, County of Cache 
State of Utah, by the Honorable Burton H. Harris 
Christine F. Soltis 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
City, Utah 84114 
Randon Draper 
Cache County Attorney 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pages 
Table of Authorities iii 
Statement of Jurisdiction 2 
Statement of Issues 2 
Standards of Review 3 
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions 3 
Statement of Case 3 
I. Nature of the Case 3 
II. Course of the Proceedings 3 
III. Disposition in Trial Court 4 
IV. Statement of Facts 4 
Presented in the Pleadings 4 
Adduced from Trial 5 
Summary of the Argument 8 
Argument 9 
Point I. Officer Kendricks Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to Detain 
Mr. James 9 
A. Introduction 9 
B. A Detention Required Reasonable Suspicion 9 
Point II. The Officer Lacked Probable Cause to Open the Door. 18 
Point III. The Officer's Warrantless Arrest Lacked Probable Cause 
or Exigent Circumstances to Arrest Mr. James 22 
Conclusion 29 
Certificate of Mailing 30 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGES 
Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990) 11 
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1994) 9, 11 
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993) 23, 24-28 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 18-22 
State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1991) 13 
State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183 (Utah App. 1994) 13 14, 17 
State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992) 15-16, 17 
State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997) 3, 9, 12 
State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) 10 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971) 22 
United States v. Cocker, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1979) 23 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 552 (1980) 10 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953, as amended) 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah State Const, art. I, section 14 9, 22 
4th Amend, U.S. Const 9 
iii 
D. Bruce Oliver #M20 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-oooOooo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
s 
DOUGLAS B. JAMES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 970544-CA 
Prioritv N 
An officer is stopped along the side • :)f the i oad, completing a pi ioi traffic stop 
when he was approached by a motorist. The motorist claimed of there being a reckless driver 
whom hit or nearly hit three other motorists. The motorist provided a license plate number, a 
bncf (Irstiiptiui) oil llir vrtiii lr .mil Us dun linn hnm Hit pluli unmix i, tin1 officer obtained 
an address. While approaching said residence, the officer witnessed the driver pull into his 
driveway. W 1 tin. ii :> cii iving pattern established b> the officer :: i 3th si in dependent 
observations, the officer blocks the driver in his driveway and initiates contact. There were no 
observed signs of physical damage to the vehicle, nor had dispatch conveyed substantiating 
reports from others of any alleged hit-and-run. Without probable cause the-driver is seized, to 
later determine that the driver may have violated the offense of driving under the influence of 
alcohol. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1997) 
(2)(3) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of 
a first degree or capital felony). The Appellant appeals the final order and judgment of the 
First Judicial District Court, in and for Cache County involving his conviction of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-
6-44 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(1) Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant 
(hereinafter "Mr. James) while in his vehicle? 
(2) Whether the officer had probable cause to open Mr. James' door to the 
vehicle? 
(3) Whether the officers had probable cause to enter into and seize Mr. James 
from his house, the garage, without a warrant? 
(4) Whether exigent circumstances existed to allow the officers to arrest Mr. 
James without a warrant? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(1) - (4) The trial court erred by denying Mr. James' Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. The State failed to show reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and exigent 
circumstances in this case. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. "We review the 
factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a clearly 
erroneous standard." State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). We 
review the trial court's conclusions based on the totality of those facts for correctness. See 
ii 
State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
[Included herewith in Addendum A.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from an appeal of the Final Judgment and Guilty Verdict of Mr. 
James for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor. Mr. James was 
acquitted of being in Possession of an Open Container, a Class B Misdemeanor. (R. at 87). 
Mr. James motioned the court to suppress evidence twice.1 Both motions were denied. 
//. Course of the Proceedings: 
This case went through a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. A Suppression 
1
 By way of written motion and by oral at time of trial. 
3 
Hearing was conducted on July 31, 1996 and the court entered a written order denying same. 
(R. at 56-58). A trial was set and held on August 7, 1997, where the trial court again denied 
Mr. James' motion to suppress and a jury convicted Mr. James of the Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol charge only. (R. at 88-90). 
///. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The trial court denied Mr. James' motions to suppress evidence, the jury found 
Mr. James Not Guilty of Possession of an Open Container, but Guilty of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol (hereinafter "DUI"). (R. at 56-58, 87). 
IV. Statement of Facts: 
Presented in the Pleadings: 
The State conceded to the following facts: (R. at 22-23).2 
1. On or about March 16, 1996, Mr. James was arrested for DUI by officers. 
2. The basis for Officer Kendricks' initial suspicion was a citizen's complaint that Mr. 
James was "all over the road and possibly struck three other vehicles." 
3. The citizen provided the officer the license number for said vehicle and the officer 
ran the plates to obtain an address. 
4. The officer pulled up to said address, he observed Mr. James pulling into his 
driveway. Therefore no driving pattern was observed. 
This stated added the additional facts in response to Mr. James' motion quoting 
2
 In the State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the State concurred 
with the defendant's recital of facts numbered 1 through 4. Also recited herein this brief. 
4 
from the police report: 
Citizen informed me of vehicle direction & license #. Stated was all over road and 
possible struck 3 other vehicle. I ran license number & obtained address. As I 
approached address, observed suspect pulling into drive. Pulled in behind as suspect 
was putting into park (foot on brake). Contacted and removed from vehicle. Observed 
alcohol in vehicle, strong odor of alcohol. Obtained driver's license, stumbled through 
wallet, dropping other wallet contents. Passenger getting belligerent. I stated to stay 
put & went to my vehicle to call for help Suspect entered home & and [sic] had to be 
recontacted from home. Very argumentative. . . . 
(R. at 43). Mr. James does not stipulate to these facts as they are not an objective 
interpretation of the events that truly took place as what was demonstrated in testimony at trial. 
Infra. 
Adduced from Trial: 
On March 16, 1996, Officer Kendricks was working State Road 101, which 
goes through Hyrum, through WellsviUe, and all the way up Blacksmith fork Canyon. (R .at 
12), when an individual in a blue Dodge Caravan approached him running up behind the 
officer. (R. at 13). During their conversation, the individual informed the officer that a 
vehicle . . . "struck three vehicles or it had come close but the fact that three vehicles were 
almost struck or ran off the road or which, I don't know; that is where it was going, this is the 
license plate number, this is the color." And the officer said, "Okay." (R. at 23). Then the 
officer concluded his stop and pulled out heading west as directed. (R. at 23, 28, 32-33).3 
Subsequently, no independent observation were made by the officer. 
3
 It was this exclusive information that was the basis for the stop and detention 
of Mr. James. (R at 33). 
5 
While in route, the officer ran the plate through dispatch and obtained the 
address of Mr. James. (R. at 24, 34). The address relayed by dispatch was Mr. James' 400 
North 89 East, Wellsville. (R. at 35). Upon approach of the address from the east, the officer 
observed a vehicle pull into the driveway which would fit the description. (R. at 36). He 
pulled in behind the vehicle blocking Mr. James' pick up truck in the driveway. (R. at 36). 
The driver of the pickup truck had his brake lights illuminated as the officer pulled in behind 
the truck. (R. at 36). 
Once there, the officer contacted dispatch reporting that he had arrived and was 
to make contact with the driver. (R. at 37). The officer noted that there were two occupants 
in the pickup, (r. at 37), a male driver and a female passenger. Later these two were 
identified as Mr. James and his significant other. The officer made no observations for 
damage to the vehicle, he immediately approached the vehicle driver door only then knocked 
on the window. (R. at 38). The officer then opened the door himself. (R. at 38). Once 
opened, he observed an open box (a twelve pack of beer), on the passenger side on the floor. 
(R. at 38). The box was open; and one container was standing on the floor on the passenger 
side. (R. at 38-39, 50). The opening of the door was the officer's exclusive and univited 
decision. This information regarding the officer's opening of the door was exculpatory 
evidence that was never provided prior to trial; not even at the suppression hearing. (R. at 
40). 
On voir dire of the officer, it was determined that the pick up was a 1995 
Chevrolet pick up truck that had not been modified. (R. at 52-53). Moreover, the officer 
could see the couple from the shoulders up. (R. at 54). The officer knocked on the window, 
6 
paused for a moment, then opened the door. (R. at 54). After which, the officer and Mr. 
James walked around the truck and found no damage to the vehicle. (R. at 55). The officer 
did not observe or attempt to observe damage to the vehicle prior to making contact with Mr. 
James. (R. at 55). 
During the contact with Mr. James, the officer noted an odor of alcohol 
emitting from the vehicle. (R. at 57). He claimed that Mr. James had slurred, slow speech. 
Additionally he remembered, "the flaccid face, the ptosis of the eyes, which is the droopy, 
red, bloodshot eyes." (R. at 57). The officer later asked Mr. James if he been drinking, and 
Mr. James replied that he had one beer. (R. at 59). The officer also believed that Mr. James 
appeared to be unstable and unable to stand straight. (R. at 61). 
At this point, the female passenger exited the vehicle and approached the officer 
allegedly "letting him have it," (r. at 59), so the officer asked Mr. James to stay put as he 
went back to his patrol car to call for help. (R. at 59-60). During this call to dispatch, Mr. 
James left his truck and entered his home, but the officer does know when as the truck blocked 
his view. (R. at 60). Afterwards, the officer reestablished contact with the female passenger, 
(r. at 62), while Mr. James was still in the home. (R. at 63). Then back up arrived 
approximately four to six minutes later as two other male individuals exited from the home. 
(R. at 62-63). 
So the officer approached the home and ordered Mr. James to come out or they 
were going to go in. (R. at 64). Upon this threat, Mr. James exited the home into the garage 
where he involuntarily submitted to a field test. (R. at 64). At this point, the officer had Mr. 
James perform a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. (R. at 65-69). The officer indicated that Mr. 
7 
James failed all six points of the test, then Mr. James refused any further tests stating: "Forget 
it, I'm not doing your tests." (R. at 72). Immediately thereafter, the officer placed Mr. 
James under arrest. (R. at 72). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The officer lacked objective facts based upon his independent observations that 
he could articulate to support the claims made by the citizen. As a result, the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. James. The officer failed to question regarding scope of 
the stop regarding reckless driving on State Road 101, and about damage to his vehicle. 
The officer lacked probable cause to open the door of Mr. James' vehicle in 
order to make contact with Mr. James when Mr. James did not open his truck door upon 
contact by the officer. The opening of the door constituted a search and seizure. 
The officers lacked probable cause and exigent circumstances, absent a warrant, 
to enter Mr. James' home to arrest Mr. James. Mr. James was in his basement upon second 
contact by the officers. Mr. James refused to exit from the kitchen to the garage, and did not 
until threatened. Nonetheless, the garage is very much a part of Mr. James' home and he is 
entitled to the same constitutional protections regarding the garage as he has to rest of the 
dwelling. Hence, the officers could not enter the garage unless they had probable cause with 
exigent circumstances, absent a warrant for arrest. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
OFFICER KENDRICKS LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION 
TO DETAIN MR. JAMES. 
A. Introduction. 
Article I Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, (emphasis 
added) 
Utah Const, art. I § 14. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is identical on content. 
B. A Detention Required Reasonable Suspicion, 
The reasonable suspicion standard is to be based on articulable, objective facts 
that are to rise to a level upon appellate review that would not result in a close de novo review. 
Furthermore, the trial court has little discretion on issues of reasonable suspicion. See State v. 
Struhs, supra. 
In the 1994 case, State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1994), this Court re-
acknowledged the Utah Supreme Court's three levels of police encounters with the public that 
are constitutionally permissible: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his [or her] will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an 
officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being committed." kL; (quoting, State v. 
9 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curium) (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984) cert, 
denied sub nom. 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250 (1986))). 
Further, the Bean Court defines a level one stop as: 
A voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's inquiries but 
is free to leave at any time. State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); accord State v. Carter, 821 
P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). 
The Court explained that a "seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street 
and questions him, if the person is willing to listen." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 
(Utah App. 1987) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). "Such consensual, voluntary discussions between citizens and police 
officers are not seizures subject to Fourth Amendment protection." Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768. 
In contrast, level two and level three stops are protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
[A] level two stop, or a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
occurs when the officer "by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way 
restrained the liberty" of a person. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552, 100 
S.Ct. 1870, 1876, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 
S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); accord, Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87. "When a 
reasonable person, based on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of 
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he believes he is not free to leave a 
seizure occurs." Trujillo, 739 at 87. "The test for when the seizure occurred is objective and 
depends on when the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer thinks 
the person is no longer free to leave." Id; (quoting, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 
10 
(Utah 1991); accord, Mendenh, ackso. 
767.) 
1
 ' " -111 
light of all other circumstances, tend to indicate a seizure has occurred, [some of which are]: 
LiJ the threatening presence of several officers, [2] the display of a weapon by 
an officer, [3] physical touching of the person of the citizen, [4] or the use of 
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request 
might be compelled." Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
at 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877). (emphasis added) 
In Bean, Judge Billings wrote, "[I]t is helpful in this highly factual context to 
facts. In Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990), this court found a level 
one stop under circumstances similar to the case at issue (emphasis added) 
In State v. Jackson, this court held that a seizure did not occur when a police 
officer stopped his patrol car behind the defendant's parked car, thus blocking it, after the 
him for identification. The court concluded that it was a level one encounter, because under 
u l s t a n c e s a r e a s o n a b i e person would have believed that he or she was free to leave. 
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768. Further, "a request for identification cannot constitute a show of 
authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter into a seizure. Only when police have in 
• way restrained tV lib- »r.:* individual. • <>? 
there a 'seizure' within the meaning of the fourth amendment." Id , (quoting United States v. 
Castellanos, JM i III ', t|i|i I ' HI I "ill ^ " Il Il S4inl 
l i 
Nonetheless, in State v. Struhs, this Court reversed the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence under circumstances comparable with this matter at 
hand. The facts as recited by this court are as follows: 
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 3, 1995, Deputy Eileen Knighton, a deputy 
paramedic with the Davis County Sheriffs Office, was patrolling North Salt Lake in a 
marked sheriffs department vehicle with her partner. Deputy Knighton observed 
defendant's pickup truck traveling toward a construction traveling toward a 
construction area. As she continued to watch, Deputy Knighton observed the truck 
turn around and back up towards barricades and a sign that read "Road Closed." Once 
there, the truck was parked, and its headlights were turned off. The truck was 
approximately two hundred feet away from an area where a number of construction 
vehicles and equipment were located. Deputy Knighton never saw anyone leave the 
truck. 
Although neither party suggests the truck had been driven illegally or was parked in an 
unlawful manner, Deputy Knighton stated she wondered why the pickup truck would 
enter an isolated area late at night when no one was working. She also was concerned 
as there had been numerous complaints of thefts in the area in the past. 
Id., at 37. This Court further analyzed: 
In order to justify a seizure, a police officer must "point to specific, articulable facts, 
which together with rationale inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude [the defendant] had committed or was about to commit a 
crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The assessment of 
whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective standard based on the totality of the 
circumstances in which an "officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of [her] 
experience" because "a trained law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and 
articulate meaning in a given conduct which would wholly innocent to die untrained 
observer." IdL at 88-89. 
Id., at 39. The Court then concluded: 
[W]e conclude Deputy Knighton's stop of defendant was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion. In the face of any number of possible innocent explanations for defendant's 
behavior, there were no specific articulable objective facts that would lead a reasonable 
person to suspect that criminal conduct was occurring or was about to occur. 
Id., at 39. As in Struhs, in the case at hand, there are no objective facts that the officer can 
specifically articulate that would lead a reasonable person to suspect that criminal activity was 
12 
afoot. The office •' - , i. - i - . •• ^ s . 
claimed by the citizen. The officer could have looked the vehicle over for damage, Mr. 
liimtV |»ii Is111» liiiii \v;ts a, l^'h ( lirvi'olil ihiii was only approximate! ,' a ytaj old at ihr time 
of the arrest. 
Furthermore, one may argue that the citizen's report is similar to an ATL. 
In July 1994, this Court, in State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183 (Utah App. u- ;t 
for determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists in order to justify an investigative stop, 
as follows: . . . 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to 
reasonably conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be 
afoot" a brief stop and detention is justified. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 
S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); accord Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1990). In other words, reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has "a 
reasonable suspicion based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in 
criminal activity." State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991) 
(quoting, State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)). In determining 
the existence of reasonable suspicion, a court must look to the totality of the 
circumstances. 
I tl, In this case, there are no observed unusual conduct. 
Furthermore, in State v, Leonard, 825 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1991), this court reiterated the 
standing Utah Supreme Court's position of the Fourth Amendment's application to individuals 
III I l l In S , I  ' ' i l i l l l l l f . ! 
While an individual has a lesser expectation of privac) in a vehicle as opposed 
to in his or her home, the protection of the Fourth Amendment still applies. See 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989), (citing California v. 
Carney, 471 U.S. 390-93,. 105 S.Ct 2066, 2068-70 (1985)). 
Id. Furthermore, the Leonard Court stated that it has further refined the Terry reasonable 
suspicion test, concluding: 
13 
[A] brief investigatory stop must be based on "objective facts" that the 
"individual is involved in criminal activity." State v. Holmes 774 P.2d 506, 
508 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
Id. The past report by the citizen does not support a belief that Mr. James was involved in a 
crime at the of the officer's contact. 
Also in 1994, this Court expanded the application of the reasonable suspicion 
standard-upholding the trial court's verdict in State v. Nguyen, by stating: 
The conduct observed and/or information relied upon need not be illegal or 
describe illegal activity in order to give a law enforcement officer reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, so long as the officer can articulate facts which 
form the basis for his or her suspicion. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 
(Utah App. 1990). Rather, the conduct observed must suggest to an officer, in 
light of that officer's experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry, 
392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884; Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. 
State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183 (Utah App. 1994). 
Mind you, these facts, under the totality of the circumstances, which form the 
basis for the officer's suspicion must absolutely be reasonable to a level that will avoid even a 
close, de novo review. In this matter, there was no objective observation to lead the officer to 
believe that Mr. James had committed the offense reported to him by the citizen. No reports 
through dispatch confirmed the report from other complainants, nor did the officer observe any 
body damage to the vehicle. 
In Nguyen,4 this Court demonstrated when the law enforcement officials 
possessed enough information to satisfy the standard for reasonable suspicion. The ATL 
relayed the following information to law enforcement officers: (1) the color and possible make 
of the car driven by the suspects, (2) an accurate license plate number, (3) the race and gender 
4
 Supra. 
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of the suspects and the direction the vohn 
attempting to sell large amounts of quarters wrapped in yellow notebook paper, (5) several 
businc'iS nptTiilois' n pnrls iiill! i nun ins iillliiiiiiiiil iiilllii ill i in imnii i1. \ 11 I i the suspects, and (6) the 
report of a recent burglary in Price, Such information could reasonably lead an officer to 
coiielude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that criminal activity may be afoot. The 
Court therefore upheld the conviction and ruled the trial court did 
law enforcement officials had reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of defendant's vehicle. 
In contrast, in State \ , Roth, H } "  I1 il ""'< I' Lili , ,|>|> I i iIn-. "« Vim liphtlJ 
a conviction of Driving Under the Influence on the basis of a University of Utah Police 
Office! !s obsei \ al :h i eporting a " • ::li i ink cii I \ s i: " In this particular case, 
a university security guard observed in detail an individual who apparently was under the 
influence. Ihe guard witnessed Roth trying to drive away in a red Pontiac Fiero. He further 
observed that Roth repeatedly started 'the vciiiw • u*ove a few fee t stalle • i a nd then " je i ke d to 
- "*— " He then had another security officer call dispatch. 
- i * . • 
investigate the report of an intoxicated male, driving a red Pontiac Fiero, license number 
88M "SI , as reported i pu r i ty office. The officers arrived and spotted the vehicle 
matching the licence number. The officer observed that he was driving "slow and jerky' 
that he "was having a hard time driving. Officer Bradfield stopped Roth's vehicle based 
was denied and was subsequently convicted. 
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In Roth, the dispatch issued was based on articulable facts. The dispatcher 
informed the investigating officers of a "drunk driver,M not the mere possibility of a drunk 
driver. See, e.g, Playle v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. App. 
1989). Moreover, the dispatcher provided a gender description of the driver, the make and 
color of the automobile, the license number, and the vehicle's location. These articulable facts 
supported the forming of reasonable suspicion by the dispatcher of the commission of an 
offense that justified the transmission of the dispatch. Consequently, because specific facts 
supported reasonable suspicion to prompt the dispatch, the arresting officer properly relied on 
the dispatch in executing the stop. The Roth Court further stated that the dispatcher 
communicated a factual foundation for the dispatch, specifically, the existence of a drunk 
driver along with a description of the driver's vehicle, license number, and location. Id, 
The Roth Court concluded that the police dispatch may have been the initial 
impetus for the officer's suspicion that Roth was driving while intoxicated. However, Officer 
Bradfield's own observations corroborated the dispatched report of a drunk driver exiting the 
University Medical Center in a red Pontiac Fiero. Therefore, the officer's observations, 
coupled with the police dispatch, sustain the trial court's determination that there was 
reasonable suspicion to stop Roth's vehicle. 
In this case, similar to these ATL dispatch cases, the officer initiated contact 
with Mr. James relying solely on the citizen's report of the alleged driving pattern and the 
possibility of an accident with three other vehicles. However, this is where the similarities 
end. What of the tb«** whirl**? What ahnnt nWrved driving behavior? Ultimately, what 
happened to the offi support any level of reasonable 
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suspicion? As explained heretofore, the Roth and Nguyen Coi n its hai e • :le te i it nined tl ic • fact 
patterns on point. Firstly, the Roth Court explained three aspects they viewed in sustaining the 
uing the 
dispatcher's information "of a 'drunk driver,' not the mere possibility of a drunk driver." (2) 
I In i ill I in i mi s piopei I) lelied on the dispatch in executing the stop, il , he dispatched report 
was supported by the officers observations. 
Secondly, the Nguyen Court explained the information an ATL needed to 
satisfy the standard for reasonable suspicion. The Court "itntnt 111 thr i oloi iiiiiiiiiii possible 
make of car driven by the suspects, (2) an accurate license plate number, (3) the race and 
Ijcmlci nil Ih " Mispi'i Is •iiiicll llii" (hirm lion III , rlnch >< MS hcailm^, ("III .Ii'dnls ol lllliii: suspects' 
conduct. . . , (5) several business operators' reports of concerns about their encounters with 
J report of a recent burglary in Price. Such information could 
reasonably lead an officer to conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that criminal 
activity may be afoot 
In this case, Officer Kendric^ 
Nguyen while failing to meet the objective standard required in Roth. At the time of the 
:iis driveway, i he officer did not observe 
any illegal conduct, nor was there a reasonable indication that he had been engaged in criminal 
activity. "therefore, the officer failed to abide by Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) requiring 
reasonable suspicion. 
The Level Two stop of Mr. James violated the 4th Amendment of the I" ~ 
thus, illegal 
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and the appropriate remedy is to suppress the evidence obtained during and following the 
illegal stop. 
POINT II. 
THE OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO OPEN THE DOOR. 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) is on point with this matter. In 
that case, the Utah Supreme Court rationalized: 
The determinative question on the unlawful search and seizure issue is whether the 
police officers were justified in opening the unlocked car door in search of the 
additional VIN to verify the VIN located on the dashboard. Defendant has challenged 
the lawfulness of the search under the Utah and the federal constitutions. 
The court of appeals, relying on New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S. Ct. 960, 89 
L. Ed. 2d 81, (1986), found defendant to have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the federal fourth amendment in the VIN discovered after the police officers 
opened the car door. State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 93-95 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The 
court read Class to compel the conclusion that, because there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the VIN, there could be no search within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment. Id We agree with the dissent below that Class does not require 
such a conclusion. 
In Class, the police officer, after stopping a car for two traffic violations and after the 
driver had left the car, reached into the car to move some papers that were obscuring 
the area of the dashboard where the VIN was located. In so doing, he saw the handle of 
a gun protruding from underneath the driver's seat. The defendant later moved to 
suppress the gun as evidence on the ground that it was the result of an illegal search. 
Because the focus of the alleged unconstitutional search in Class was the gun rather 
than the VIN itself, the Court, while holding, that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a VIN, did not clearly articulate when one has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a VIN located inside one's automobile. In State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 
(Utah 1989), we addressed the issue of whether a police officer's opening the passenger 
door for investigatory purposes constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. In 
finding that such conduct was subject to fourth amendment protection, we cited Class 
to stand for the proposition that a search had occurred: 
[T]he Supreme Court stated that "a car's interior as a whole is... subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police." The 
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Court held that an officer's opening the driver's door of an automobile to 
examine the vehicle identification number constituted a "search" and that the 
search was justified because the officer sought only to uncover the VIN.. a 
number required by state law to be located in plain view from outside the 
vehicle. The Court warned, however, that "[i]f the VIN is in the plain view of 
someone outside the vehicle, there is no justification for governmental intrusion 
into the passenger compartment to see it." 
IdL at 1135 (quoting Class, 475 U.S. at 114-15, 119). We think Judge Billings of the 
court of appeals was correct in her dissent: 
[T]he reasoning of the Supreme Court in Class persuades me that defendant had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN located inside his car after the 
officers had read the VIN on his dashboard from outside the car and found 
nothing out of the ordinary which would justify a further search. 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d at 102. 
Thus, Class may fairly be lead as meaning that an officer's opening a car door to 
examine a VIN on a doorjamb constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. This 
view would be consistent with the view taken by Professor LaFave, who in his treatise 
on search and seizure wrote with reference to Class: 
|Aju assumption that the phrase tins search* refers only to the physical 
intrusion into the interior is hardly a compelling one. Nor is the matter settled 
by the Court's statement that there is no privacy expectation as to the VIN on 
the doorjamb, for that is also true of the dashboard VIN but yet did not stop the 
Court from concluding that very limited steps to reveal that VIN still had to be 
characterized as a search. Given the Supreme Court's earlier conclusion in Katz 
that a physical entry into a "constitutionally protected area" is not essential in 
order for there to have occurred a Fourth Amendment search, it would seem 
that opening a vehicle door to see an otherwise hidden VIN is likewise a 
search.... 
1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.5(d), at 456-57 (id ed. 198 /). Because of its 
facts, Class is open to conflicting interpretations. Were we deciding this case under 
federal law, we would hold that a search was conducted within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment. Instead of relying on federal law, however, we analyze this 
question under the Utah Constitution. 
The court's analysis didn'y end there though; it went on reviewing the issue under the State 
Constitution to determine that greater protection of rights was warranted. The Court stated: 
In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), this court explained that because of the 
similarity between article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth 
amendment of the United States Constitution, we have not in the past drawn any 
distinctions between the protections respectively afforded by them. Id. at 1221. We 
then noted, however, that "we have by no means ruled out the possibility of doing so in 
some future case" since "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different 
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens 
from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the 
federal courts." Id at n.8. As the Washington Supreme Court stated under similar 
circumstances: 
Prior reliance on federal precedent and federal constitutional provisions [does] 
not preclude us from taking a more expansive view of [the state constitution] 
where the United States Supreme Court determines to further limit federal 
guarantees in a manner inconsistent with our prior pronouncements. 
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136, 140-41 (1984). 
An increasing number of state courts are relying on an analysis of the search and 
seizure provisions of their own constitutions to expand or maintain constitutional 
protection beyond the scope mandated by the fourth amendment. See e.g., State v. 
Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978); State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 467 A.2d 571 
(1983); People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313, on 
remand from New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81, 106 S. Ct. 960, 
(1986); State v. Caraher, 293 Ore. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982); State v. Opperman, 247 
N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976). 
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), this court, in applying another 
provision of the Utah Constitution which has a counterpart in the federal bill of rights, 
showed a willingness to diverge from the United States Supreme Court's application of 
the equal protection clause: 
Although Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same general 
fundamental principles as are incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause, our 
construction and application of Article I, § 24 are not controlled by the federal 
courts' construction and application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case law 
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may be persuasive in applying 
Article I, § 24, but that law is not binding so long as we do not reach a result 
that violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Id. at 670 (citations omitted); see also State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981). 
Several state courts have found that conduct similar to that of the police in this case 
does constitute a search. In State v. Turechek, 74 Ore. App. 228, 702 P.2d 1131, 
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(1985), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a police officer "conducted a search 
within the meaning of Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution when he opened 
the door [of a pickup truck] to inspect the VIN." 74 Or. App. at , 702 P.2d at 
1134. In finding a search, the court quoted the Washington Supreme Court, which had 
recognized in State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 184, 622 P.2d 1199, 1208 (1980), 
"The degree of privacy interest in the part of the vehicle where the VIN is located is a 
separate question from the extent of privacy interest in the serial number itself." State 
v. Turechek, 74 Or. App. at , 702 P.2d at 1133-34. The Supreme Court of Hawaii 
has taken the view that checking an engine number which is located inside the vehicle 
constitutes a search under the Hawaii Constitution. See State v. Moore, 66 Haw. 202, 
659 P.2d 70 (1983); State v. Agnasan, 62 Haw. 252, 614 P.2d 393 (1980). In 
addition, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held under its state constitution "that an 
official inspection of a VIN which is not in plain view and which is located within the 
vehicle constitutes a search." State v. McGann, 1 °4 NJ H at Afn A 2d at 573. 
I he New \ ork Court of Appeals maintained the view that the state constitution had 
been violated even after the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth 
amendment had not in People v. Class. More recently, in People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 
224, 543 N. E. 2d 61, 544 N. Y. S.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1989), that court elaborated on 
its rationale for independent state constitutional analysis: 
[W]e note that although the history and identical language of the state and 
federal constitutional privacy guarantees generally support a "policy of 
uniformity," this court has demonstrated its willingness to adopt more protect!\ e 
standards under the state Constitution "when doing so best promotes 
predictability and precision in judicial review of search and seizure cases and 
the protection of the individual rights of our citizens." (People v. P.J. Video, 68 
N, Y. 2d 296, 304, 508 N. Y, S. 2d 907, 501 N. E. 2d 556 (on remand) 
quoting People v. Johnson, 66 N. Y. 2d 398, 497 N. Y. S. 2d 618, 488 N. E. 
2d 439). Accordingly, we have in recent years carved out an independent body 
of principles to govern citizen-police encounters in a number of specific 
A ponce officer s entry into a citizen1" s automobile and his inspection of 
personal effects located within are significant encroachments upon that citizenfs 
privacy interests.... Under our own longstanding precedent, such intrusions 
must be both justified in their inception and reasonably related in scope and 
intensity to the circumstances which rendered their initiation permissible.... 
,4 .V 1. " at 63-65 S44 N. Y. S. 2d at 798-800 (citations 
omitted). 
We likewise conclude that a constitutional privacy interest exists in the interior of an 
automobile and that the opening of the car door by the police officer here constituted a 
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search. We now determine whether this search violated article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Our analysis logically begins with a consideration of the history of the 
warrant requirement under the federal constitution with respect to automobile searches. 
With this principle clearly in mind, its conclusive that Officer Kendricks' 
actions constituted a seizure when he opened the court door much to Mr. James' surprise after 
knocking on the window. The officer at this point lacked any probable cause to believe that 
Mr. James was engaged in criminal activity. It wasn't until the door was opened that the 
officer would be able to detect the odor of alcohol or observe the open container on the floor. 
Again, there was no corroborating objective fact that the officer could formulate articulable the 
belief that Mr. James had violated any offense. 
POINT III. 
THE OFFICER'S WARRANTLESS ARREST LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE 
OR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO ARREST MR. JAMES. 
Once Mr. James was left by the officer, he entered his home prior to being 
advised that he was under arrest. Therefore, Article I, section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution is directly as issue of this point pertaining to his house. Article I Section 14 
provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is identical in 
content. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "In the absence of certain well-defined and 
limited exceptions to the warrant requirement, a warrantless seizure is presumptively 
unreasonable." See, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).) Furthermore, the 
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government bears a heavy burden when it seeks to justify warrantless arrests and searches. 
United States v. Coker, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1979). 
In this case there is a warrantless entry into Mr. James' home by the arresting 
officer. The officer approached Mr. James1 home with back up without a warrant, which 
upsets the language contained in State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993). That case 
provides the following sound guidance: 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons 
[and] houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." When police make a 
seizure, Fourth Amendment analysis begins with an assessment of whether that seizure 
occurred in a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). When Davis emerged briefly into the common 
hallway, he had a diminished expectation of privacy, see United States v. 
Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 953, 110 S. Ct. 
364 (1989), and the police were therefore free to make an investigatory stop if they had 
reasonable articulable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 20-23, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-1881, 1884 (1968). However, the 
undisputed factual findings indicate that Officer Humphries reached across the 
threshold of apartment 4B to seize the retreating Davis. Thus, the seizure occurred 
within the constitutionally protected confines of a private residence, where citizens 
enjoy a heightened expectation of privacy. 
Id. Regarding warrantless searches, the U.S. Supreme Court has further emphasized the 
requirements necessary to uphold the 4th Amendment: 
Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 
313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134 (1972). Consequently, warrantless searches and seizures 
within a home or other private premises are per se unreasonable absent exigent 
circumstances. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980); Brown, 
201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. "Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not 
reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct. at 
1382. 
Id. 
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In this case, Mr. James was in his home when the officer attempted to effect his 
arrest without warrant. There was no consent to enter and furthermore, there were no exigent 
circumstances to seize Mr. James. Therefore, any and all evidence gathered on this occasion 
was in violation of Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution. In light of circumstances the evidence should be suppressed. 
In Beavers, Judge Orme wrote: 
Given the thrust of the state's argument, the primary issue before us is whether the 
Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless entry into a private residence on the basis of 
reasonable, articulable suspicion—the level of suspicion necessary to justify an 
investigatory Terry stop—or whether such an entry is justified solely on the basis of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons 
[and] houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." When police make a 
seizure, Fourth Amendment analysis begins with an assessment of whether that seizure 
occurred in a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah 1992). When Davis emerged 
briefly into the common hallway, he had a diminished expectation of privacy, see 
United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 
953, 110 S. Ct. 364 (1989), and the police were therefore free to make an 
investigatory stop if they had reasonable articulable suspicion that "criminal activity 
may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-23, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-1881, 
1884 (1968). However, the undisputed factual findings indicate that Officer Humphries 
reached across the threshold of apartment 4B to seize the retreating Davis. Thus, the 
seizure occurred within the constitutionally protected confines of a private residence, 
where citizens enjoy a heightened expectation of privacy. 
"Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 
313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134 (1972). Consequently, warrantless searches and seizures 
within a home or other private premises are per se unreasonable absent exigent 
circumstances. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980); Brown, 
201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. "Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not 
reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct. at 
1382. 
The State bears the particularly heavy burden of proving the warrantless entry into a 
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home falls within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984); State v. 
Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah App. 1991). Even when exigent circumstances 
exist the Fourth Amendment always requires probable cause as a basis for entry into a 
private residence. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-89, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381 
(1980); United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Socey, 269 U.S. App. D.C. 453, 846 F.2d 1439, 1444 n.5 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 
488 U.S. 858, 109 S. Ct. 152 (1988). See also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1259 
(Utah 1987) (probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into 
a home). Despite this two-fold requirement for warrantless entry, the State argues that, 
under the "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement, entry into private 
premises is permissible by merely showing police had articulable suspicion. We 
disagree. 
The United States Supreme Court has held "that a suspect may not defeat an arrest 
which has been set in motion in a public place . . . by the expedient of escaping to a 
private place." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2410 
(1976). Accord State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah App. 1991). In Santana, 
police had probable cause to arrest defendant on the basis of a just-completed drug buy. 
Upon finding the defendant standing at the threshold to her house, in an area the Court 
ruled was a public place, police attempted to stop her, whereupon she retreated into the 
house. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40, 96 S. Ct. at 2408. Police followed her into the house, 
seized her, and found heroin and cash with serial numbers matching that used in the 
drug buy. LI at 40-41, 96 S. Ct. at 2408-09. The Court reasoned that the hot pursuit 
into defendants house was justifiable because the police lawfully initiated the arrest in 
a public place based on probable cause, idL at 42, 96 S. Ct. at 2409, and because there 
was "a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence." Id 
at 43, 96 S. Ct. at 2410. 
Some courts have extended the hot pursuit doctrine to Terry stops. See, e.g., United 
States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1229 (7th Cir.) (following car of would-be assassin into 
his parking garage), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1030, 110 S. Ct. 3286 (1990), and, 498 
U.S. 878, H I S . Ct. 210 (1990); Harbin v. City of Alexandria, 712 F. Supp. 67, 72 
(E.D. Va. 1989) (police verbally stopping suspect inside house from position on front 
porch), affd, 908 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990); Edwards v. United States, 364 A.2d 
1209, 1214 (D.C. App. 1976) (chasing suspects into house) (Edwards I), affd on other 
grounds, 379 A.2d 976 (D.C. App. 1977) (en banc) (Edwards II); People v. Rivera, 
233 111. App. 3d 69, 598 N. E. 2d 423, 428, 174 111. Dec. 226 (111. App. 1992) 
(chasing suspect from public area of bar to private basement area); State v. Penas, 200 
Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835, 836-37 (Neb. 1978) (traffic misdemeanor suspect pulled 
from home). Of these cases, Edwards I is the most frequently cited as support for the 
proposition that police may make a warrantless entry into private premises for the 
purpose of completing a lawful Terry stop premised solely on reasonable suspicion. 
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In Edwards I, police patrolling a residential neighborhood late at night noticed 
defendant and his companion carrying electronic sound equipment and a bedsheet 
stuffed with unknown goods. The sheet was marked in the manner employed by the 
nursery facility attended by the son of one of the officers. Edwards I, 364 A.2d at 
1212. When police approached the pair they ran. The officers chased them up a flight 
of stairs and followed them through a door, which had been slammed and left 
unlocked, into defendant's apartment. The Edwards I panel read the gravamen of the 
Court's holding in Santana to be that when a citizen has knowingly placed himself in a 
public place and valid police action is commenced in that public place, the citizen 
cannot thwart that police action by then fleeing into a private place. 
Id. at 1214 (emphasis added). While acknowledging that police must generally have 
probable cause to make a warrantless entry into a dwelling to arrest someone or to seize 
contraband, the Edward I's court viewed the facts before it "as presenting quite a 
different situation requiring the application of a rule of reason" which justified the 
warrantless entry. IcL 
As a jurisprudential matter, we do not view Edwards I as viable precedent for the 
proposition that warrantless entries into private premises can be justified solely on the 
basis of reasonable suspicion. While the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
affirmed the result of Edwards I en banc, it did so by concluding that police had 
probable cause to arrest defendants at the outset of the chase and their entry into the 
apartment was justified under Santana. Edwards II, 379 A.2d at 978-79. Thus, the 
extension of the hot pursuit doctrine to Terry stops by the Edwards I panel was 
rendered dicta, at best, by the en banc decision. 
More importantly, we believe the Edwards I panel misinterpreted the Santana decision. 
We view the Santana Court's articulation of the hot pursuit doctrine as nothing more 
than a specific application of the general rule that a warrantless entry of a private 
residence must be justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Nowhere in 
Santana did the Court hint it was expanding the application of this rule to circumstances 
amounting to less than probable cause. In fact, as noted above, the Santana Court, by 
its own language, based its decision on the facts that the police possessed probable 
cause to arrest defendant and defendant's action created an exigency whereby evidence 
of a serious crime would have been destroyed had police delayed their pursuit. Santana, 
427 U.S. at 42-43, 96 S. Ct. at 2409-10. 
By expanding the Santana exception to Terry stops, the Edwards I panel disregarded 
the Supreme Court's directive that exceptions to the warrant requirement should be few 
in number, carefully delineated, and jealously drawn. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 749, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 
1987). Moreover, in Welsh the Supreme Court narrowed rather than expanded 
Santana's carefully delineated exception to the warrant requirement by holding that, 
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despite the State's claim that potential loss of evidence constituted exigent 
circumstances, police entry into a home to arrest a suspected drunk driver was 
unconstitutional, notwithstanding the existence of outright probable cause, because the 
suspected offense was "minor." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, 104 S. Ct. at 2099. See also 
supra note 6. The Court reasoned that the government's interest in arresting defendant 
for a minor offense was insufficient to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness 
attached to the warrantless search of a home. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750-754, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2098-2100. 
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the application of Terry 
principles to warrantless entries of a home, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
apparently discerning extensive discussion unnecessary, unequivocally concluded that 
"the Terry analysis does not apply to intrusion into the home . . . because an 
individual's residence enjoys special protection under the Fourth Amendment." United 
States v. Tobin, 890 F.2d 319, 327 (11th Cir. 1989), vacated, 902 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 
1990) (en banc) (granting rehearing). Although the original panel's decision was 
vacated, the Eleventh Circuit, in an en banc opinion following rehearing, noted the 
original panel's view regarding extension of Terry principles and agreed that 
"reasonable suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house." United States 
v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (police entry into home justified 
because probable cause and exigent circumstances existed), cert, denied U.S. , 
112 S. Ct. 299 (U.S. 1991). Still another court has explicitly refused to "extend the 
scope of a Terry protective search into the private recesses of one's dwelling when an 
officer stands at the threshold with merely reasonable suspicion to support an 
investigation." State v. Davis, 295 Ore. 227, 666 P.2d 802, 812 (Or. 1983) (en banc). 
In Davis, police responded to a reported fight at a motel. IcL at 804. Upon arrival, 
police were informed that there was an ongoing rape in a specific room, but when 
police knocked on the door the purported victim emerged frilly clothed and apparently 
unfrightened. Police talked with defendant for a moment and noticed an empty holster 
protruding from a backpack on the bed. IcL The officers restrained defendant in the 
motel room and in the ensuing search found a gun and drugs. 
Noting that any emergency with respect to the woman had clearly ended, the Davis 
court rejected the State's claims that an emergency required police to enter and search 
the room for their own safety and that the search was justified on the basis of 
reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned: 
The state attempts to bootstrap the police officers' entry into Defendant's room 
by merging two independent doctrines i.e., the stop and frisk doctrine with the 
emergency doctrine, in order to fill the gaps of one doctrine with the arguably 
permissible scope of another. Thus, their "emergency" or exigent circumstance, 
is, in their words, the need to "neutralize" the area for their own protection 
while carrying on the questioning. We decline the invitation to stretch either of 
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these doctrines in order to justify the police officers' actions based on the facts 
presented here. Such a modification or blending of the two doctrines would 
create an exception to the warrant requirement which would effectively swallow 
the rule. 
Id at 812. The court concluded that extending Terry to allow police entry into private 
dwellings would contradict the principle that exceptions to the search requirement be 
carefully drawn. IcL 
This reasoning applies to the State's argument in the present case, especially in light of 
Officer Humphries's testimony that he feared for his safety once he was inside the 
apartment, yet he never testified that any fear existed before entering the apartment to 
seize Davis. An entirely new, expansive exception to the search warrant requirement 
would arise if police could seize citizens in their homes on the basis of reasonable 
suspicion, and justify further intrusions by a reasonable fear for their safety once 
inside. Instead of merely expanding the "probable cause plus exigent circumstances" 
exception as the state would have us believe, permitting such intrusions would create a 
wholly new, untenably circular "reasonable suspicion and emergencies created by 
entry" exception. 
Furthermore, the rationale for permitting warrantless entries into private residences is 
totally inapplicable in the Terry context. Warrantless entries are justified with probable 
cause and exigent circumstances because in such circumstances, the delay to obtain a 
search warrant would risk "physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, [or] the escape of the suspect." United States v. 
Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 
F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
Id. In this case, there is no evidence supporting the belief that there was exigent circumstances 
requiring a warrantless arrest. No evidence was offered stating that an arrest at that time 
would place the officers at risk of physical harm, that the destruction of relevant evidence was 
likely, or that the suspect would have the opportunity to escape. The officers had no business 
entering Mr. James' garage to arrest him. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. James clearly should not have been convicted if not for plain errors 
committed during prosecution of this case. Both the facts and the law fail to support any 
conviction of an offense by Mr. James. No evidence should have been presented to the jury at 
all; it should have been suppressed prior to trial. Clearly, if there is not a basis to convict Mr. 
James of Possession of an Open Container, there should be no basis to support the conviction 
of Driving Under the Influence. 
Therefore, this Honorable Court should vacate the order and reverse the trial 
court's decision and award Mr. James his reasonable attorney fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of 
April, 1998. 
4y*£*cs^j%* -
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Amendment IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Amendment V. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capi-
tal, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use without just compensation. 
Amendment VI. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed; which district 
sh*J1 bavp bpprj nreviotislv ascertained bv law, and 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by rlue course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal ;n this State, by himself or 
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or 
in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
January 1,1995 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be 
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, 
unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of 
the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the 
Legislature. 
January 1, 1949 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
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warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the 
jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and 
was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be 
acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. 
1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding 
debtors. 
1896 
Sec 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time 
interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, 
may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 
1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall be passed. 
1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, or in 
adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 
1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power, and no soldier 
in time of peace, shall be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; 
nor in time of war except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
1896 
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